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Abstract
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems,
which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are com-
plex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is
nested within the other. Despite a number of studies on handling bilevel
optimization problems, these problems still remain a challenging territory,
and existing methodologies are able to handle only simple problems with few
variables under assumptions of continuity and differentiability. In this paper,
we consider a special case of a multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg
competition model with non-linear cost and demand functions and discrete
production variables. The model has potential applications, for instance in
aircraft manufacturing industry, which is an oligopoly where a few giant firms
enjoy a tremendous commitment power over the other smaller players. We
solve cases with different number of leaders and followers, and show how the
entrance or exit of a player affects the profits of the other players. In the
presence of various model complexities, we use a computationally intensive
nested evolutionary strategy to find an optimal solution for the model. The
strategy is evaluated on a test-suite of bilevel problems, and it has been
shown that the method is successful in handling difficult bilevel problems.
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1. Introduction
The relevance of bilevel optimization problems has been amply recognized
by researchers and practitioners alike [1]. The key difference between bilevel
programming problems and other optimization problems is their nested struc-
ture. A bilevel program is commonly defined as an optimization problem,
which contains another optimization task within the constraints of the outer
problem. The outer optimization problem is generally termed as the upper
level problem, and the constraining optimization task is denominated as the
lower level problem. Such a nested structure means that a solution to the
upper level problem is considered feasible only if it is an optimal solution to
the lower level problem. Because of this requirement, bilevel optimization
problems can quickly become very difficult to solve.
Bilevel optimization problems often appear as leader-follower problems in
the fields of game theory and economics. When formulating a leader-follower
scenario as a bilevel programming problem, the leader’s optimization task
is modeled at the upper level, constrained by the follower’s optimization
task at the lower level. The leader has the ability to move first, and is
assumed to possess all necessary information about the follower’s possible
reactions to the actions taken by the leader. The follower, on the other
hand, observes the leader’s actions before reacting optimally to them. By
solving a Stackelberg competition model, the leader can forecast the follower’s
reactions and determine his own optimal actions.
In this paper, we model a particular kind of oligopolistic market involving
multiple leaders and followers interacting over multiple time periods. Such
a scenario can be analysed as a special case of a multi-period multi-leader-
follower Stackelberg game. This problem builds on the original definition
of duopolistic competition proposed by Stackelberg [2] and its various ex-
tensions [3, 4, 5, 6]. The multi-period market model presented in this paper
allows us to incorporate relevant dynamics and several practical aspects, such
as investment and marketing effects, in a flexible manner. As an extension to
the prior work, we also assume the production of all players in this market to
be discrete variables while allowing the investment and marketing decisions
to be continuous. This feature makes the model framework applicable to
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markets where the products are valuable and are not well approximated by
continuous variables, such as in the aircraft manufacturing market. Further
realism is added to the problem in the form of non-linear demand and cost
functions, and constraints on investment and marketing budget for both the
leaders and the followers. The effects of investment and marketing are con-
sidered to be cumulative leading to interactions between the time-periods.
Evolutionary algorithms have been used in the past in the domain of game
theory with players making simultaneous moves (Nash Equilibria), players
making asynchronous moves, or a mix of the two situations. For instance,
Lung et al. [7] consider a multi-player game and propose a domination con-
cept to detect the Nash-equilibria using an evolutionary multi-objective al-
gorithm. Koh [8] proposes an evolutionary algorithm for handling a similar
model with multiple leaders and followers as considered in this paper. How-
ever, Koh assumes that it is possible to write the first-order conditions for
the lower level problem, which is not possible in the problem considered in
this paper. Classical techniques like branch-and-bound have also been ap-
plied to handle bilevel problems involving multiple players. Lu et al. [9] use
a branch-and-bound technique to handle linear Stackelberg problems with a
single leader and multiple followers. Zhang et al. [10] study a similar problem
with a single leader and multiple followers, but in this study the functions
involve fuzzy coefficients and multiple objectives at both levels.
Many studies have been conducted in the field of bilevel programming
[11, 12, 13, 14] and on its practical applications for solving various problems
[1]. Aspects of bilevel programming have also been reviewed in detail by
Colson et al. [11] and Vicente and Calamai [12]. The problems encountered
in the literature are commonly solved with the help of approximate solution
methodologies [15, 16, 17]. These techniques work with numerous simplify-
ing assumptions, and most of them are inapplicable to problems with higher
levels of complexity. The classical methods widely employed by researchers
and practitioners to solve these problems include the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
approach [15, 18], Branch-and-bound techniques [19] and the use of penalty
functions [20]. However, the recent technological advances and increased
computing power have made heuristic approaches, such as evolutionary al-
gorithms, more popular for solving complex optimization problems. Evolu-
tionary algorithms have also been applied to bilevel programming problems
[5, 21, 22, 23, 14]. Given the encouraging results obtained with such tech-
niques, we have also opted to employ a nested evolutionary algorithm to
solve the multi-leader-flower problem. The choice is well motivated by the
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complexities due to non-linearity and discreteness that are inherent in our
model for oligopolistic markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a
general formulation of a multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg com-
petition model. Section 3 outlines a more concrete model with a discussion
about its possible application to the aircraft manufacturing market. Section
4 contains a description of the procedure followed by the nested bilevel evo-
lutionary algorithm to arrive at the optimal solution, and then in Section
5 we evaluate the proposed nested bilevel evolutionary algorithm. Section
6 presents the results on the multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg
optimization problem. Section 7 provides a convergence analysis on a sim-
plistic version of the Stackelberg competition model. Lastly, the conclusions
and plans for future work are summarized in Section 8.
2. Generalized Stackelberg Competition Model
Three main models – the Bertrand, Cournot, and Stackelberg competi-
tion models – are extensively applied in economics when modeling multi-firm
competition [4, 6, 24]. The first two models are generally used when the com-
peting firms have an approximately equal amount of market power, and make
production and pricing decisions simultaneously. However, in an oligopoly,
where some of the competing firms have more market power than others, a
Stackelberg model is considered more suitable. Such markets are much more
common in practice than strict oligopolies and deserve more attention [3, 6].
In this section, we outline some of the notations used throughout the rest of
this paper and present a generalized formulation of a Stackelberg competition
model with multiple leaders and followers.
In the context of the multi-leader-follower problem framework, a strategy
is defined as a sequence of decisions made by a player throughout the duration
of the game. A strategy for a leader i can be stated as sl,i =
(
stl,i
)T
t=1
∈ Sl,i,
where stl,i is a particular decision made by the leader at time t, and Sl,i is the
set of all alternative strategies available to leader i. Similarly, we denote a
strategy for a follower j as sf,j =
(
stf,j
)T
t=1
∈ Sf,j , where s
t
f,j is a particular
decision of follower j at time t, and Sf,j is the set of alternative strategies.
A combination of strategies adopted by N leaders for the entire duration of
the game can be presented as sl =
(
sl,1, . . . , sl,N
)
∈ Sl, and for M followers
as sf =
(
sf,1, . . . , sf,M
)
∈ Sf , where the decision spaces Sl, Sf are defined
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as
Sl =
N∏
i=1
Sl,i and Sf =
M∏
j=1
Sf,j .
By optimizing the objectives of the competing firms in these Stackelberg
games, we obtain the optimal strategies for the leaders and followers as the
solution.
Definition (General Stackelberg Competition Model). A general multi-leader-
follower Stackelberg competition model with N leaders and M followers may
be formulated as
max
sl,sf
N∑
i=1
Ψl,i(sl, sf) (1)
s.t. sf = argmax
sf
{
M∑
j=1
Ψf,j(sl, sf) : gf,h(sl, sf) ≤ 0, h ∈ {1, . . . , H}
}
,
(2)
gl,k(sl, sf) ≤ 0, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, (3)
sl ∈ Sl, sf ∈ Sf , (4)
where Ψl,i,Ψf,j denote the objective functions for leader i and follower j
respectively. Similarly, the constraints for the leaders and followers are given
by mappings gl,k and gf,h. The number of constraints for the leaders and
followers is K and H respectively.
Each of the N leaders acts as a traditional Stackelberg leader towards
the follower firms, but as a Cournot firm with respect to the other N −
1 leaders. The N leaders choose their strategies simultaneously and non-
cooperatively among themselves, as in a classic Cournot competition model,
but collectively they are in a Stackelberg competition with the follower firms.
Similarly, the M followers act as Stackelberg followers towards the leaders
and as Cournot firms with respect to each other. Thus, the model consists of
two Cournot competitions encompassed by a Stackelberg competition model.
The generality of the formulation allows us to easily extend the problem to
include as many leaders and followers as necessary, and to make them as
different from one another as needed to model a real-world market situation.
However, in this paper we assume that the N leaders and M followers are
symmetric among themselves.
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In the next section, we present a more concrete example of this general
model. Additional complexity is introduced into this extended model by
incorporating investment and marketing variables into each decision, expen-
diture constraints, and discrete production variables into the model for both
the leaders and the followers.
3. Multi-Leader-Follower Stackelberg Model
A classic Stackelberg game involves a single leader and a single follower,
and the game is played for just one period. Such strict duopolies are very
difficult, if not impossible, to find in practice. Oligopolies, i.e. markets with
a small number of competing firms, are more common. When the markets
have more than one distinct leader and follower, the situation corresponds to
a multi-leader-follower Stackelberg game. In such settings, the firms with the
first movers’ advantage become the Stackelberg leaders, and the others act
as followers. As already mentioned, in the model considered in this paper,
we assume that the group of firms which act as leaders or followers compete
in a Cournot fashion within their respective groups.
An example of such a market is the aircraft manufacturing industry. Due
to the high market entry costs, the player base is relatively small and stable.
The market is dominated by a couple of large players, namely Boeing and
Airbus, who satisfy most of the commercial demand for airplanes, and can
be safely regarded as the market leaders. Contracts that are small for these
market giants are filled by the smaller players, who do not experience the
same economies of scale as the leaders and rightfully assume the positions of
the followers in this market. Due to the high costs of the products, each firm
in the market tries to optimize its decisions to reduce costs and streamline its
processes. Furthermore, the players’ production quantities are discrete and
comparatively small, meaning that the production of one additional unit
may lead to significant shifts in profits. While we do not specifically try to
model this particular market, the framework presented in this section could
be applied to it without much alteration.
There are several aspects that differentiate the model discussed in this
section from a traditional Stackelberg game. The main differences are the
presence of multiple leaders and followers, the addition of multiple time pe-
riods and the interrelation between those periods caused by investment and
marketing expenditures made in each period. Additional realism is intro-
duced into the model by requiring the production amounts to be discrete for
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both the leaders and the followers. This allows us to replicate the behaviour
of those markets where unit cost of production is high. It is also worth noting
that a player’s ability to invest is not equivalent to their ability to borrow
or lend extra funds, which implies that the players have to finance their
investment and marketing projects from their own revenues. As a further
modification, we relax the strict product homogeneity assumption inherent
in the original Stackelberg competition model. By assuming that the prod-
ucts are not perfectly homogeneous but still substitutable, we can allow each
firm to influence the price of its own goods to a certain degree by means of
marketing.
In the following, we define the variables used in this model for leader i
and follower j respectively:
• Ql,i and Qf,j are the demands for products
• Pl,i and Pf,j are the prices for products
• Ψl,i and Ψf,j are the profits
• Cl,i and Cf,j are the production costs
• Il,i and If,j are the investment amounts
• Ml,i and Mf,j are the marketing expenditures
• ql,i and qf,j are the production levels
A superscript t, when added to any of these variables, denotes the value
for the variable at time period t. A leader’s decision in any time period t is
made up of choosing the production level, investment amount, and marketing
expenditure for that period and can be written as stl,i =
(
qtl,i, I
t
l,i,M
t
l,i
)
.
Similarly, a follower’s decision in the same time period is made up of his own
production level, investment and marketing expenditure and can be written
as stf,j =
(
qtf,j , I
t
f,j,M
t
f,j
)
. The production variables of both players are
assumed to be discrete, while their investment and marketing expenditures
are expressed in monetary terms and are hence continuous. Therefore, the
decision spaces of the leaders and followers for any time period t are given by
Stl,i = K×R
+×R+ and Stf,j = K×R
+×R+ respectively, where K = N∪{0}.
Using the above-defined notation, the multi-period multi-leader-follower
Stackelberg competition model can be expressed as follows:
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max
sl,sf
Ψl(sl, sf) =
N∑
i=1
Ψl,i(sl, sf) (5)
s.t.
sf = argmax
sf
{Ψf (sl, sf) =
M∑
j=1
Ψf,j(sl, sf) :
qtf,j ≥ Q
t
f,j,
I t+1f,j ≤ αf
(
P tf,j q
t
f,j − C
t
f,j
)
,
M t+1f,j ≤ βf
(
P tf,j q
t
f,j − C
t
f,j
)
,
I1f,j = 0, M
1
f,j = 0.} (6)
qtl,i ≥ Q
t
l,i, (7)
I t+1l,i ≤ αl
(
P tl,i q
t
l,i − C
t
l,i
)
, (8)
M t+1l,i ≤ βl
(
P tl,i q
t
l,i − C
t
l,i
)
, (9)
I1l,i = 0, M
1
l,i = 0, (10)
sl ∈ Sl, sf ∈ Sf . (11)
In the above formulation, it is assumed that all the leaders and follow-
ers are capable of satisfying the entire market’s demand for their products,
and this assumption is reflected by constraint (7) and the corresponding
constraint for the followers. The restrictions on the size of investment and
marketing expenditures are given by constraints (8, 9) and the respective
constraints for the followers. We also require that 0 ≤ αl, βl, αf , βf ≤ 1,
(αl + βl) ≤ 1 and (αf + βf) ≤ 1, which implies that investment and market-
ing expenditures must not exceed revenue in the previous period. Constraint
(10) and the follower’s respective constraint show that both investment and
marketing are null for both firms in the first period because there is no rev-
enue yet to fund these expenditures.
The sum of profits of the leaders and followers may be further decomposed
as
Ψl,i(sl, sf) =
T∑
t=1
Ψtl,i(sl, sf) and Ψf,j(sl, sf) =
T∑
t=1
Ψtf,j(sl, sf),
where Ψtl,i and Ψ
t
f,j are the profits generated by leader i and follower j during
period t. The single period profits are calculated by deducting production,
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investment, and marketing expenses from total revenue, i.e.
Ψtl,i = P
t
l,i q
t
l,i − C
t
l,i −M
t
l,i − I
t
l,i and Ψ
t
f,j = P
t
f,j q
t
f,j − C
t
f,j −M
t
f,j − I
t
f,j .
4. Solution Methodology
We solve the above problem using a computationally intensive nested
scheme relying on the principles of evolutionary computation. The method
is based on a steady state single-objective real-coded genetic algorithm to
solve the problems at both levels. The underlying algorithm at both levels
is a modified version of the procedures [25, 26] based on the single objective
Parent Centric Crossover (PCX) [27]. The nested bilevel evolutionary algo-
rithm used to solve the described multi-period multi-leader-follower problem
is a simple-minded strategy, where the lower level problem is solved for all
given upper level decision vectors. Whenever the lower level optimal decision
vector is to be determined for an upper level decision vector, the informa-
tion is utilized from the nearest upper level decision vector for which the
lower level optimal decision vector is known. A step-by-step procedure for
the algorithm is described as follows:
Step 1: Initialization. A random population of size Np is initialized by
generating the required number of upper level variables, and then the lower
level optimization procedure is executed to determine the corresponding op-
timal lower level variables. Fitness is assigned based on upper level function
value and constraints.
Step 2: Selection of upper level parents. Randomly choose 2µ members
from the previously obtained population and conduct a tournament selection
to determine µ sets of parents.
Step 3: Evolution at the upper level. Create λ offsprings by performing a
PCX based crossover [27] (Refer Sub-section 4.3) and a polynomial mutation
for the real variables, and a binary crossover and a binary mutation for the
discrete variables.
Step 4: Lower level optimization. For each of the generated offsprings,
determine the closest upper level member in the population. Copy the lower
level optimal variables from the closest upper level member. Thereafter, gen-
erate a lower level random population with a population size np− 1. Include
the lower level variables from the closest upper level member in the lower
level population as the nthp member. Perform the lower level optimization
run with the generated population members.
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Step 5: Evaluate offsprings. Combine the upper level variables for the
offsprings from Step 3 with the corresponding optimal lower level variables
from Step 4, and evaluate each of the offsprings.
Step 6: Population update. After evaluating the offsprings, choose r ran-
dom members from the parent population and pool them with the λ off-
springs. The best r members from the pool replace the chosen r members
from the population.
Step 7: Termination check. Perform a termination check and proceed to
the next generation (Step 2) if the termination check (Refer Sub-section 4.5)
is false.
4.1. Lower Level Optimization
The lower level optimization procedure is similar to the upper level pro-
cedure. The fitness assignment at this level is performed based on lower level
function value and constraints. After initializing np lower level members, 2µ
members are randomly chosen from the population. A tournament selection
is performed and µ parents are chosen for crossover. Crossover and muta-
tion operators are used to to generate λ offsprings. A population update is
performed as before by choosing r random members from the population. A
pool is formed using r chosen members and λ offsprings, from which the best
r members are used to replace the r chosen members from the population.
The next generation is executed if the termination criteria is not satisfied.
4.2. Parameters
The parameters in the algorithm are fixed as µ = 3, λ = 3 and r = 2.
Crossover probability is fixed at 0.9 and the mutation probability is 0.1. The
upper level population size Np and the lower level population size np are fixed
as 100.
4.3. Crossover Operator
The crossover operator used in Step 3 is similar to the PCX operator
proposed in [26]. The operator creates a new solution from 3 parents as
follows, choosing one of the parents as the index parent:
c = xp + ωξd+ ωη
p2 − p1
2
(12)
The terms used in the above equation are defined as follows:
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• xp is the index parent
• d = xp − g, where g is the mean of µ parents
• p1 and p2 are the other two parents
• ωξ = 0.1 and ωη =
∑mr
i=1
mr
|xip−g
i|
are the two parameters, where mr is
the number of real variables in the problem
The two parameters ωξ and ωη, describe the extent of variations along the
respective directions. While creating λ = 3 offsprings from µ = 3 parents,
each parent is chosen as an index parent at a time.
4.4. Constraint Handling
The constraint handling scheme proposed by Deb [28] is used in this
paper. At both levels, a constraint violation is defined as the sum of vio-
lations of all constraints for any point. A member of the population with
a smaller constraint violation is always preferred by the algorithm over a
member with a higher constraint violation. A member with no constraint
violation is deemed to be a feasible, and is considered better than any of the
other infeasible members. When making a comparison between two feasible
members, the member with the higher function value is preferred.
4.5. Termination Check
The algorithm uses a variance-based termination criteria at both levels.
When the value of η, described in the following equation becomes less than
ηstop, the algorithm terminates.
η =
∑m
i=1
σ2(xicurrent)
σ2(xi
initial
)
. (13)
The value of η is restricted between 0 and 1 in (13). In the above equation,
m corresponds to the number of dimensions in the considered optimization
problem. Thus, this value is equal to the number of lower level variables for
the lower level problem and to the number of upper level variables for the
upper level problem. The variables in the current population are denoted
by xicurrent : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, and the variables of the initial population are
given by xiinitial : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. For both levels, the value of ηstop is set as
10−5.
For all the runs performed in this paper, we execute a mutation-based
local-search at both the levels after the termination of the algorithm to check
if the algorithm has properly converged. In the later part of this paper, we
evaluate the described nested bilevel evolutionary algorithm on a set of bilevel
test problems, and then solve the multi-period multi-leader-follower problem.
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5. Algorithm Evaluation
The algorithm described above is evaluated on a set of recently proposed
SMD [29] test problems to determine its efficacy towards handling difficult
bilevel problems. The test set considered in this paper contains 6 test prob-
lems, which evaluate the solution procedure accross various difficulties of-
fered by commonly encountered bilevel optimization problems. We provide
the results of the algorithm on 10 and 20 variable instances of the SMD test
problems. For 10-variable instances of the SMD problems, Table 1 shows the
number of function evaluations required at the upper and lower levels, and
Table 2 provides the accuracy1 achieved along with the average number of
lower level function evaluations required per lower level call. Similar results
are reported for the 20-variable instances in Tables 3 and 4. All performance
metrics have been computed based on 31 runs of the evolutionary procedure.
Table 1: Function evaluations (FE) for the upper level (UL) and the lower level (LL) from
31 runs of 10-variable instances of SMD test problems.
Pr. No. Best Median Worst
Total LL Total UL Total LL Total UL Total LL Total UL
FE FE FE FE FE FE
SMD1 853319 1150 1692741 2639 2178997 3640
SMD2 1030789 1459 1557348 2387 2232534 3787
SMD3 879785 1238 1476206 2390 1978647 2992
SMD4 581078 710 1134376 1687 1438936 2153
SMD5 1217102 1683 2021104 2966 2904080 3772
SMD6 1303778 1646 2463058 3301 3230143 4165
Next, we perform a scalability analysis to test the performance of the
procedure, when the number of variables are even higher. SMD1 and SMD2
have been chosen for scalability study, and for both the problems 10, 20,
30 and 40 variable instances have been solved. For each instance, we have
performed 31 runs, and the results for the required function evaluations are
presented in Figures 1 and 2 for SMD1 and Figures 3 and 4 for SMD2. The
algorithm converges successfully for each of the runs with a high accuracy.
1Accuracy is calculated by computing the Euclidean distance of the solution obtained
using the algorithm from the actual optimal solution of the problem.
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Figure 1: Lower level function evaluations
for SMD1 from 31 runs of the nested bilevel
solution procedure.
Number of Variables
 2000
 4000
 6000
 8000
 10000
 12000
 14000
 0  10  20  30  40  50
N
um
be
r o
f U
L 
Fu
n.
 E
va
ls.
 0
Figure 2: Upper level function evaluations
for SMD1 from 31 runs of the nested bilevel
solution procedure.
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Figure 3: Lower level function evaluations
for SMD2 from 31 runs of the nested bilevel
solution procedure.
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Figure 4: Upper level function evaluations
for SMD2 from 31 runs of the nested bilevel
solution procedure.
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Table 2: Accuracy for the upper and lower levels, and the lower level calls from 31 runs
of 10-variable instances of SMD test problems.
Pr. No. Median Median Median
UL Accuracy LL Accuracy LL Calls LL Evals
LL Calls
SMD1 0.000036 0.000015 2639 641.39
SMD2 0.000006 0.000005 2387 652.39
SMD3 0.000064 0.000023 2390 617.64
SMD4 0.000028 0.000027 1687 672.60
SMD5 0.000004 0.000003 2966 681.37
SMD6 0.000157 0.000081 3301 746.07
Table 3: Function evaluations (FE) for the upper level (UL) and the lower level (LL) from
31 runs of 20-variable instances of SMD test problems.
Pr. No. Best Median Worst
Total LL Total UL Total LL Total UL Total LL Total UL
FE FE FE FE FE FE
SMD1 2802304 2828 4665029 4686 6263539 6436
SMD2 1839478 2568 3561479 3866 4694610 5304
SMD3 3104455 2498 4988453 4494 6825706 6061
SMD4 1287695 2069 2435796 3250 3362992 4434
SMD5 4641337 4479 8933839 7404 12274821 9699
SMD6 4959916 3481 8246468 6874 10985316 9043
6. Results for Multi-Leader-Follower Stackelberg Model
In this section, we provide the cost and the inverse demand functions for
the leaders and the followers in the multi-leader-follower Stackelberg model,
and solve the problem using the nested bilevel evolutionary algorithm. In
the model, we assume that the N leaders and M followers are symmetric
amongst themselves. Therefore, the cost and inverse demand functions for
each firm in the respective groups are identical. The cost and inverse demand
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Table 4: Accuracy for the upper and lower levels, and the lower level calls from 31 runs
of 20-variable instances of SMD test problems.
Pr. No. Median Median Median
UL Accuracy LL Accuracy LL Calls LL Evals
LL Calls
SMD1 0.000247 0.000143 4686 995.52
SMD2 0.000146 0.000169 3866 921.23
SMD3 0.000442 0.000155 4494 1110.03
SMD4 0.000526 0.000171 3250 749.48
SMD5 0.000011 0.000013 7404 1206.62
SMD6 0.000745 0.000351 6874 1199.66
functions for the leaders and followers at time period t are defined as follows:
P tl,i =
100
(
1 + 10
∑t−1
r=1M
r
l,i
)0.02(
1 + 0.01(
∑N
i=1Q
t
l,i +
∑M
j=1Q
t
f,j)
)0.5 , (14)
Ctl,i =
0.025q2l,i + 0.02ql,i + 200 + 400 log(1 + ql,i)
exp
(∑t−1
r=1 I
r
l,i
10, 000
) , (15)
P tf,j =
100
(
1 + 10
∑t−1
r=1M
r
f,i
)0.02(
1 + 0.01(
∑N
i=1Q
t
l,i +
∑M
j=1Q
t
f,j)
)0.5 , (16)
Ctf,j =
0.025q2f,i + 0.02qf,i + 200 + 400 log(1 + qf,i)
exp
(∑t−1
r=1 I
r
f,i
10, 000
) . (17)
The cost (15,17) and inverse demand (14,16) functions of the leaders and
the followers are affected by their own cumulative investment and marketing
expenditures respectively. Additionally, the price of the leaders’ and follow-
ers’ products depends on the total demand for the product and is inversely
related to it. One could readily observe that we have kept the functions for
the leaders similar to the followers even though no symmetry was assumed
between the two groups. The rationale for this arrangement is discussed later
in this section.
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Cumulative investment introduces a further complication in the proposed
model by creating an interaction between time periods. In other words,
an amount invested in period t will affect not only period t + 1 but also
all of the following periods. This prevents us from solving the model one
period at a time. Thus, when considering each period, the investment in
all previous periods must be taken into account. Cumulative marketing also
leads to interaction among time periods. Even though the two group of firms
have similar price functions, their products need not be homogeneous, as the
price not only depends on the overall demand but is also influenced by the
marketing expenditures made by the firms.
Investment may also be viewed as a production adjustment cost, if the
company is investing in additional capacity or improving its capital stock.
Jun and Vives [30] studied a symmetric duopoly with production adjustment
costs. These costs may be modeled in different ways. For example, produc-
tion adjustment costs may include menu costs, setup costs, and per-unit cost
changes due to economies of scale. While we do not view investment as an
adjustment cost in our presented model, it may still be considered as one due
to our assumption of the firms investing in R&D or new capital.
As explained by Karray and Mart´ın-Herra´n [31], the marketing effects
of competing firms that produce substitutable products are ambiguous. The
effectiveness of marketing depends largely on the availability of media outlets.
When information is readily available, marketing tends to be complimentary
in the sense that one firm’s marketing increases the demand not only for its
own products, but also for similar products made by other firms. Conversely,
with few media outlets, marketing is competitive and mostly increases the
demand for the marketing firm’s products. Based on this, the demand curves
of each firm should ideally include the effects of its own marketing as well
as that of the rival firm. However, since the effects of rival advertising can
be either positive or negative, further assumptions are required to properly
include them into the model. We do not make any such assumptions and
exclude the rival firm’s marketing effect from the inverse-demand function,
thereby assuming that any possible complimentary effects of rival marketing
are offset by the competitive aspects.
Next, we present the results obtained using the nested bilevel evolution-
ary algorithm on the multi-period multi-leader-follower problem. We solve
the model described in equations (5)-(11), with the profit and cost functions
defined in (14)-(17). Since we assume symmetrical leaders and symmetrical
followers, the decision variables are identical among the leaders as well as
16
among the followers at the optimum. It should be noted that the nature
of the cost and inverse demand functions assumed for the leaders is identi-
cal to that of the followers. However, as we will observe from the results,
the decision variables for the leaders will be different from the followers at
the optimum. The profit and cost functions of the leaders have been kept
similar to the followers for the purpose of highlighting a very important and
defining characteristic of Stackelberg competition: the first mover’s advan-
tage experienced by the leaders over the followers. The results in this section
are divided into two parts. In the first part, we present the results for a
particular scenario, where there are 2 leaders and 5 followers. Thereafter, in
the second part, we analyse the multi-leader-follower problem by varying the
leaders and followers in the model.
6.1. Part 1
In this sub-section, we discuss the results obtained using the nested bilevel
evolutionary algorithm on the multi-leader-follower problem with 2 leaders
and 5 followers. The considered problem has been optimized over 5 time
periods. There are 20 variables for an individual firm in the Stackelberg
framework, with 5 corresponding to demand, 5 corresponding to produc-
tion, 5 corresponding to investment, and 5 corresponding to marketing. This
makes the overall problem a 140-variable problem with 40 variables at the
upper level and 100 variables at the lower level. Out of these variables, the
variables corresponding to production and demand are discrete, and the rest
are continuous. The variable bounds for the discrete variables are all integer
values from 0 to 1000, and the variable bounds for the continuous variables
are all real values from 0 to 1000.
We do not solve the problem as is, rather we first simplify it based on
ideas from microeconomic theory:
• At the optimum, demand is equal to supply,
• When firms are symmetric, their behaviour at Cournot equilibrium is
identical.
Demand being equal to supply at the optimum eliminates the demand vari-
ables from the model, which reduces the model size by 5 variables for an
individual firm. Furthermore, the first period always has zero investment
and marketing expenditures at both levels, which allows us to eliminate 2
more variables for each firm. Therefore, we finally end up with 13 variables
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Table 5: Computational expense required by the nested bilevel evolutionary algorithm to
solve the multi-period multi-leader-follower problem with 2 leaders and 5 followers.
Function Evaluations Upper Level Lower Level
Min 3,564 39,356,642
Median 4,610 55,553,874
Max 6,324 76,456,562
for every firm in the model. Our assumption of symmetrical leaders and sym-
metrical followers reduces the size of the optimization problem being solved
to 26, where the upper level optimization problem has 13 variables and the
lower level problem also has 13 variables. Both levels contain an investment
and a marketing constraint for each of the time periods (excluding the first
time period) for each of the firms. This makes the number of constraints at
the upper level as 8 and the number of constraints at the lower level as 8.
From here onwards, we present the results obtained by solving the bilevel
optimization model using the nested bilevel evolutionary algorithm. Multiple
runs were performed, each starting with a different random initial population.
We chose the best solution obtained from 31 runs to report the results for
the leader-follower problem. The upper and lower level function evaluations
required by the algorithm to converge towards the optimal solution are shown
in Table 5. One could readily observe the high number of lower level function
evaluations required to solve the multi-leader-follower problem. The reason
for this, as mentioned earlier, is that the nested approach solves a lower
level optimization task for each new upper level member generated by the
algorithm.
The best results from 31 runs are shown in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8. Figures 5
and 6 present the optimal production and period profits (without deductions)
over multiple time periods for each of the firms in the system. The period
profits are reported without deducting the marketing and investment expen-
ditures made by the firm. The graphs show that the leaders produce more
and make a higher profit as compared to the followers. The difference is due
to the first mover’s advantage of the leaders. Figures 7 and 8 show the invest-
ment and marketing expenditures for the leaders and the followers. All of
the constraints in the problem under consideration are active at the optima,
thus keeping the investment and marketing variables at their upper limits
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Figure 5: Leader and follower production
in a multi-leader-follower model with 5 time
periods.
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Figure 6: Leader and follower profits in each
of the time-periods. Investment and market-
ing expenditures are not deducted from the
reported profits.
1 2 3 4 5
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Periods
In
ve
st
m
en
t
 
 
Leader Investment
Follower Investment
Figure 7: Leader and follower investment
expenditures in a Stackelberg competition
model with 5 time periods.
1 2 3 4 5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Periods
M
ar
ke
tin
g
 
 
Leader Marketing
Follower Marketing
Figure 8: Leader and follower marketing
expenditures in a Stackelberg competition
model with 5 time periods.
19
1 2 3 4 5
200
300
400
500
600
700
Periods
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0
100
200
300
400
500
Periods
In
ve
st
m
en
t
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0
50
100
150
200
250
Periods
M
ar
ke
tin
g
 
 
Leader
Follower
1 2 3 4 5
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Periods
Pd
. P
r. 
(w
o. 
de
d.)
 
 
Figure 9: Leader’s objective function with respect to non-optimal production variables,
when the follower follows an optimal strategy for each upper level vector.
in the constraints. A further relaxation of the constraints would lead to an
increase in profits.
After presenting the optimal solution to the problem, we look at a couple
of non-optimal solutions. We consider two non-optimal upper level decisions,
and observe the optimal lower level responses to those decisions. For sim-
plicity, it is assumed that all the leaders operate with the same non-optimal
strategy. Firstly, we consider a scenario, where the leaders decide to pro-
duce substantially more than what is suggested by the Stackelberg optimum,
while utilizing the maximum possible budget for investment and marketing.
Figure 9 shows this scenario, and the resulting profits of the leaders and the
followers. It can be observed that under such a situation, the leaders make
substantially lower profits, and the profits of the followers also get reduced.
Individual leaders end up making smaller profits than the followers at this
non-optimal point even though their productions are higher. Secondly, we
consider a scenario, where the leaders decide to produce substantially less
than what is suggested by the Stackelberg optimum, while utilizing the max-
imum possible budget for investment and marketing. Figure 10 shows this
scenario, and the resulting profits of the leaders and the followers. In this
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Figure 10: Leader’s objective function with respect to non-optimal production variables,
when the follower follows an optimal strategy for each upper level vector.
scenario, the leaders once again make substantially lower profits, and the
profits of the followers rise significantly.
Next, we look at the termination check, η, over generations from a par-
ticular run of the algorithm. It can be observed in Figure 11 that the value
of η drops sharply over the initial generations of the algorithm and then the
algorithm slowly converges. The distribution of the population members at
various stages of the algorithm are also shown in the figure.
The lower level optimization problem is a mixed integer non-linear pro-
gramming problem. Therefore, it is possible to handle the lower level problem
using a MINLP Solver. We replace the lower level evolutionary scheme im-
plemented in the nested bilevel evolutionary algorithm with a MINLP Solver
(TOMLAB Optimization) and record the savings in function evaluation. Ta-
ble 6 provides the results, when a MINLP Solver is used at the lower level.
One can observe that using this approach leads to savings of almost 60%
at the lower level. However, it is noteworthy that the MINLP Solver makes
the procedure less generic, as it cannot be used at the lower level in case of
lower level problems having complications like multi-modalities, and various
kinds of discontinuities. For example, the solver will fail to handle even small
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Figure 11: Termination check, η, over generations. The algorithm terminates when η ≤
ηstop. Population distributions are shown at three different stages of the algorithm.
instances of SDM3, SMD4 and SMD5 test problems.
6.2. Part 2
In this sub-section, we further analyze the problem by varying the number
of leaders and followers in the system. We vary the number of leaders as well
as followers from 1 to 5, which generates a total of 25 different Stackelberg
competition scenarios. Each competition model is separately optimized and
the results are reported. The cost and the inverse-demand functions are all
Table 6: Computational expense required by the MINLP Solver to solve the multi-period
multi-leader-follower problems with 2 leaders and 5 followers.
Function Evaluations Upper Level Lower Level
Min 3,468 16,458,426
Median 4,584 22,663,442
Max 6,782 36,763,428
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Figure 12: Individual leader profit (cumu-
lative profit in 5 time periods) in a multi-
leader-follower model when the number of
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Figure 13: Individual follower profit (cumu-
lative profit in 5 time periods) in a multi-
leader-follower model when the number of
leaders and followers are varied.
kept fixed throughout the simulation study. The model is the same as before
except that the number of leaders and followers are varying.
Figures 12 and 13 show the profit (without deductions) for individual
leaders and followers. We observe that in the case of a single leader and a
single follower, the leader makes a higher profit as compared to the follower.
The higher profit for the leader, in this case, can be attributed to the first
mover’s advantage. In the cases, when the number of leaders or followers is
increased, the profit at the corresponding level gets distributed among the
players. Since the leaders are identical, they make the same profit, and this
is also the case for the followers. We observe that an addition of a player
either at the leaders’ level or at the followers’ level causes a reduction in
profit for all of the players. The reduction is substantial for the existing
leaders, if a new player enters at the leaders’ level, vis-a`-vis, if a new player
enters at the followers’ level, it causes a substantial reduction in profits for
the existing followers. Figures 14 and 15 show the production levels for the
leaders and followers respectively, and we observe that the production levels
for the individual players are falling with every new entrant.
Table 7 provides the values for total profit, without deduction of mar-
keting and investment expenditures, generated from the market in each of
the models. It is interesting to observe that the total profit, i.e. the sum of
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Figure 14: Individual leader production lev-
els (cumulative productions in 5 time peri-
ods) in a multi-leader-follower model when
the number of leaders and followers are var-
ied.
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Figure 15: Individual follower production
levels (cumulative productions in 5 time pe-
riods) in a multi-leader-follower model when
the number of leaders and followers are var-
ied.
profits earned by all of the players in the model, reduces with an increasing
number of players. On the other hand, if we look at the production levels
in Table 8, we observe that the total production increases with increasing
number of players in the model. From this, we conclude that each extra
player, either at the upper level or at the lower level, leads to an increase in
production and a reduction in price to such an extent that the overall profit
for the players falls. This offers an advantage to the consumers as the market
becomes more competitive.
7. Convergence Analysis
In this section, we analyse the convergence properties of the nested bilevel
evolutionary algorithm on a single-leader and single-follower model operating
in two time periods. The reason for choosing a simple problem with two time
periods is that it would involve two production variables for the leader as well
as the follower making it possible for us to represent the solutions graphically.
Moreover, it also enables the use of a grid search around the optimal solution
found by the evolutionary algorithm to check if the algorithm has converged
to the true optima.
To begin with, we execute the nested bilevel evolutionary algorithm on
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Table 7: Sum of individual profits without deductions over all the players at the optimum
for different Stackelberg competitions with i number of leaders and j number of followers.
The number of leaders is presented across rows and the number of followers across columns.
105× 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5 F
1 L 1.0900 1.1133 1.1122 1.0984 1.0695
2 L 1.1038 1.0892 1.0690 1.0386 1.0008
3 L 1.1013 1.0634 1.0339 0.9847 0.9294
4 L 1.0849 1.0306 0.9800 0.9270 0.8719
5 L 1.0573 0.9898 0.9287 0.8700 0.8088
Table 8: Sum of individual productions over all the players at the optimum for different
Stackelberg competitions with i number of leaders and j number of followers. The number
of leaders is presented across rows and the number of followers across columns.
104× 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5 F
1 L 0.6970 0.8087 0.9033 0.9843 1.0597
2 L 0.8231 0.9513 1.0500 1.1362 1.2122
3 L 0.9271 1.0612 1.1563 1.2533 1.3404
4 L 1.0158 1.1543 1.2631 1.3557 1.4348
5 L 1.0945 1.2388 1.3504 1.4406 1.5210
this simple problem. The solution obtained by the approach is given in Table
9. A grid search is then performed around the obtained solution at the upper
and the lower levels to verify the veracity of the solution obtained using
the nested bilevel evolutionary algorithm. The solution of the grid search
is shown in Figure 16 with respect to the production variables. A lower
level grid search was performed for each of the upper level vectors, and the
lower level optimal solutions corresponding to those upper level vectors were
determined. The left panel shows the upper level profit contours, when the
lower level decision vectors are at their optimum. The right panel shows the
lower level profit contours for one particular upper level decision vector, which
is the optimal upper level decision vector. The optimal solution obtained
using the grid search is found to be the same as the one obtained using the
nested bilevel evolutionary approach. All the constraints were found to be
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Table 9: Optimal leader-follower decisions for a simple 2-period single-leader single-follower
problem.
Leader Follower
q1l = 486 q
1
f = 463
q2l = 585 q
2
f = 573
I1l = 0 I
1
f = 0
I2l = 1.2831e+ 03 I
2
f = 1.2542e+ 03
M1l = 0 M
1
f = 0
M2l = 6.4155e+ 02 M
2
f = 6.2708e+ 02
Ψl = 1.4191e+ 04 Ψf = 1.3963e+ 04
active at the optimum.
The complexity of the problem can be recognized by observing the leader’s
objective function with respect to the production variables in Figure 17, when
the follower’s decision vectors are at their optimum. The uneven surface at
the upper level is due to the discrete nature of the lower level problem. Figure
18 provides the convergence plot for the algorithm over generations. The
plot shows the leader’s objective function value and the follower’s objective
function value for the elite individual over generations. It can be observed
that the leader’s objective function value continuously improves, whereas this
is not necessary for the follower’s objective function value.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a formulation of a multi-period, multi-
leader-follower Stackelberg competition model with N leaders, M followers,
and T time periods. The formulation can be applied to oligopolistic markets,
and one possible application has been briefly discussed. A nested bilevel
evolutionary algorithm was used to solve the problem. The ability of the
algorithm towards solving difficult bilevel problems has been tested on a
recently proposed test-suite of SMD test problems.
We have solved a concrete version of the multi-period, multi-leader-follower
Stackelberg competition model that included 2 leaders, 5 followers, and 5
time periods by employing the nested bilevel evolutionary framework. The
approach is computationally intensive, but is easily parallelizable. It allows
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us to solve the problem despite the difficulties presented by certain assump-
tions of the model that conventional bilevel methodologies would not be able
to overcome. An analysis of the model has also been performed by varying
the number of leaders and followers in the system.
Our future efforts would be directed at improving the overall efficiency of
the solution methodology so that it can handle more complex problems with a
higher number of variables. Additional intelligence needs to be incorporated
into the algorithm so that it converges to the optimal solution more quickly.
There is also room to improve the problem formulation to reflect the real-
world market situations more accurately. A multi-objective extension of the
problem would be of further interest.
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